[Vwdiesel] Patriotism and limping home

[Scott Kair]

    Interesting and astute observations, Val.
    FWIW, when I was out Christmas shopping, I noticed that Belton
Cooper's _Death Traps_ is back in print.  Cooper was an ordnance/
maintenance officer in one of the Third Army's armored divisions
during the northern European campaign of 1944-45 and his book is a
substantial contribution to the literature on that subject.
    The title refers to one of the more plain-spoken nicknames for the
M4 Sherman tank, a more pithy one being the "Ronson," because like
that brand of cigarette lighter, they allegedly ignited  first time,
every time.  Cooper confirms that prior to engagement, crews were
selected for mechanical experience and aptitude, and encouraged, to a
point, to repair and make modifications to their machines.
    He recounts in detail the "field expedient" design, construction
and deployment of the hedgerow busters attached to the tanks, which
were so critical in allowing forces deployed in Normandy to break out
into open country and on to Paris and the Rhine.  The solution to the
problem of the ancient hedgerows had eluded officers to the point of
paralysis, but came from an inspired sergeant at a repair depot.
Hillbilly engineering saved the day again.
    Of course, within a short period, the marked inferiority of the
Sherman vs. the newer generations of German panzers became clearly
evident, and was manifested in truly shocking loss rates of machines
and casualties among crews.  By the time of the Ardennes
counteroffensive, conscript infantrymen were being pulled from
replacement depots and placed in tanks with no training, on the
assumption that Americans are inherently adept at handling machinery.
This merely added to the loss rate.
    While giving full credit to the American tank crews' uncommon
valor and dedication, Cooper, who was in charge of retrieving and
repairing tanks broken or damaged beyond the crews' ability to repair
them, does not make the mistake of crediting our victory solely to the
superiority of our armored spearhead.  Other factors were also
obviously at work.
    Perhaps the most revealing episode was his account of finding some
paperwork in England, when the unit was training prior to deployment,
that he regretted not stealing and keeping.  It was notes on an
earlier meeting between Gen. Patton and manufacturers'
representatives.  Patton was asked to select whether to focus on
producing the extant M4 Sherman, with its vulnerable armor, low
velocity main gun that was as effective against German armor as
throwing bricks, and narrow tracks that merely got it stuck in deep
mud, or the newer and far superior M26 Pershing.
    Patton chose the Sherman, on the grounds that more could be
produced.  While that logic proved solid, the underlying assumption
was proven false- it was fortunate that more Shermans could be
produced merely because more had to be produced in order to replace
those lost in action.
    Cooper's account of the success, and low loss rate, of the M26
when it was finally deployed in 1945 was very telling.
    Scott Kair