Dear NMA Member:
Please consider this to be a call to action on your part. We ask that you
write a petition (request letter) to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) to reconsider the "Final Rule" on air bag on-off
switches. Below is a description of the petition format and a list of 24
possible reasons to object. Please choose at least three, but not more
than 10, of the reasons, and craft a simple request letter that emphasizes
the reasons you feel are most important. With your help, we can make it
clear to NHTSA and DOT that we believe their handling of this issue has
been unacceptable,
and that the controversy is not over.
Thanks for your efforts, and for supporting the NMA!
Todd Franklin, Communications Director
PS: This document was created by member James C. Walker, who has a very
strong interest in the air bag issue. If you have any questions for him,
please e-mail him at jcwconsult@aol.com.
You may wish to also send a copies of your petition to:
Mr. Rodney Slater
Secretary
Department of Transportation
400 Seventh St., S. W.
Washington, DC 20590
President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
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The Final Rule issued 11/18/97 for air bag on-off switches has a 45 day
window for formal petitions to reconsider this rule. Anyone can file such
a petition, citing reasons why the final rule requires reconsideration.
The 45 day window goes to 1/2/98, but it is best for petitions to arrive by
12/29/97. You can find the final rule and all related documents at
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/airbags, and they will be the first items on your
screen.
A petition for reconsideration should be addressed as follows:
Docket No. NHTSA-97-3111
Administrator
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
400 Seventh Street, S. W.
Washington, DC 20590
There are many points where the rulemaking is faulty and on which you could
base a petition for reconsideration. Please select a few of these points,
add any points of your own, and format a petition. It would be best if you
decide which issues are most important to you, and use some of your own
words, so that your petition expresses the emphasis you feel is correct.
(The petition should open with a clear statement to identify your intent,
such as:)
Dear Administrator:
I petition the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to reconsider
the Final Rule on Air Bag On-Off Switches, issued under Docket No.
NHTSA-97-3111 for these reasons.
(Here you cite your points and any supporting data. Then the petition
should close with another clear statement of the action(s) you request
under your petition, such as:)
Based upon the above points, I request that NHTSA modify the rule recently
issued for air bag on-off Switches and take the following specific actions:
(Please put these into your own words, but the two major requests that are
needed for a disconnection rule are (1) that switches should be freely
available, on request, without proving membership in any particular risk
group and (2) that simpler wiring-disconnects should be freely available,
on request, without proving membership in any particular risk group. The
only requirements under this rule should be (a) receipt of a brochure
denoting the pros and cons of disconnection and (b) recording that the
particular vehicle has had some or all of the air bags disconnected, a
function usually done by the service shop.)
Signed,
Your name (Be sure you show your full address somewhere on the petition.)
Possible points of contention and objection.
1. In NHTSA's 1/6/97 Request for Comments on disconnection, they
specifically stated: "However, the agency believes it is necessary in
establishing safety requirements to take into account how people behave in
the real world." Since about 39% of children now ride in the front seat,
and such actions are not illegal, the new rule obviously fails to account
for this real world fact. This leaves millions of legally-seated children
at risk for injury or death by air bags. Every vehicle owner that will
ever carry a child in the front seat must have the legal ability to turn a
passenger air bag off while any children are in the front seat. It is
improper for NHTSA to require legally-seated children to be under constant
threat of being injured or killed by air bags, regardless of how low is the
risk.
2. NHTSA's Final Economic Assessment on FMVSS No. 208 for Air Bag On-Off
Switches contains critical errors in the calculations of switch costs.
NHTSA says that a switch for one seating position would cost between $38
and $63 installed, or $51 to $76 for a switch controlling both bags. Ford
made an estimate of switch costs of $95 to $124 for a switch controlling
both bags. Virtually every recent quote of costs in the press is that
switches will cost $150 to $200 for one side, installed, and slightly less
for the second one, perhaps $100. Therefore, the economic impact is
underestimated by 400% to 600% with the NHTSA numbers, and is possibly
understated by 50% to 100% with the Ford estimates. This error calls the
entire economic impact assessment into question, as you cannot base an
analysis on numbers with errors of 50% to 600% and draw any valid
conclusions. In general the cost estimates used by NHTSA are valid for the
simpler, cheaper, and totally reversible wiring disconnection methods, but
are totally invalid for on-off switches. Further, NHTSA's overall customer
cost impact uses the costs for a switch controlling both bags, but the
highly restrictive rules make it extremely difficult to qualify for
permission to buy switches for both sides - and thus the entire calculation
methodology is flawed.
3. NHTSA's estimation methodology for total lives saved of 2,620 by
11/1/97 goes back to a data subset where seat belt usage is not known for
many of the cases. Since belts do 90% to 95% of the job of protection, any
overall estimate of the effects of air bags in preventing fatalities that
depends on a data subset where belt usage is not known, is simply not
scientifically valid. It is probable that the numbers saved by air bags
are far fewer, and the numbers killed by air bags are far higher, than
promoted by NHTSA statements. For further information, see the editorial
by Dr. Evans at http://www.motorists.com/AirBags/DrEvans.html which
confirms the NHTSA
overestimation of saved.
4. NHTSA noted that, with no behavior changes or bag force reductions, an
estimated 140 children would be killed by air bags annually, once all
vehicles had 1997 and earlier style air bags. They suggest that the
depowered bags allowed for 1998 would save 47 of those children, but this
means that 93 could still die. This is not acceptable, and the portion of
the other 93 at risk children who ride in the front seat for part of the
time require the availability of an on-off switch to save their lives.
5. NHTSA received about 600 comments from individuals and about 500
supported deactivation, or simple wiring disconnects, as the way to turn
off air bags. The other 100 supported either switches, or both switches
and wiring disconnects. Essentially all of these individual commenters
supported deactivation on request, i.e. without regard to their membership
in any risk group. The new NHTSA rule denies the request of virtually 100%
of all individual commenters, and this is obviously wrongful. This means
that NHTSA requested and received sincere comments from 600 individuals,
and denied them all.
6. Two of the most important group and company commenters, the National
Transportation Safety Board and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
supported deactivation on request, i.e. without regard to their membership
in any risk group. The new NHTSA rule denies the request of the NTSB, the
federal agency charged with the safety of all forms of transportation, and
denies the request of perhaps the most visible insurance industry group.
This is clearly wrongful for NHTSA to deny the requests of these two
organizations.
7. Various surveys have shown different percentages of people that want to
disconnect. One survey in August (not quoted by NHTSA in their documents)
said that 16% would pay $50 to $200 to deactivate drivers side bags and 22%
would do so for passenger side bags. To deny the requests of 16% to 22% of
the public that are willing to pay to protect themselves and their families
from air bag dangers is wrongful of NHTSA.
8. After a long discussion of the rate of probable on-off switch
acquisition, NHTSA concluded that costs and explanations of risks would
make the rate lower than the surveys. Under the new NHTSA rule, the
acquisition rate will be lower than the surveys, primarily because NHTSA
will deny the right to purchase a switch to most people, unless they are
willing to commit federal
perjury under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001. This is an
unacceptable choice to present to terrified people - continue to drive
under threat of severe injury or death, or commit federal perjury.
9. NHTSA's own estimates for even the 20% to 35% depowered bags available
from 1998 models still reflect a killed-to-saved ratio for passenger side
air bags of about one child killed for each seven adults saved. It is
unacceptable to not allow any vehicle owner to protect the lives of all
children in the front seat, as it is fully legal for them to be there.
10. NHTSA says they are not aware of cases where children were saved by
air bags. Air bags have essentially no benefits for children, contrary to
statements by NHTSA in the 1970's and 1980's, but have clearly negative
results, as measured by recent deaths. Therefore it is wrongful of NHTSA
to refuse to allow switches for any vehicle owner who ever carries children
in the front seat. By not allowing switches for those owners, NHTSA is
expressly raising the risks of child deaths, with no known benefits
provided to them.
11. NHTSA data estimates in Table 11 of the Final Economic Assessment that
full fleet impacts of air bags on non-fatal injuries will be to
deliberately require the injury of 32,220 people in order to reduce the
injuries to 66,486 people. No other federal regulation ever known, in any
field of endeavor, mandates negative effects on about half the number of
people who receive positive benefits. This risk benefit ratio is simply
unacceptable for a mandated device. Every vehicle owner who wants a switch
or wiring disconnect for an air bag, for any reason whatsoever, must be
allowed to make that informed choice of which risks they agree to undertake.
12. NHTSA completely ignored the impact of certain career-threatening
non-fatal injuries to some people. About 3% of all deployments involve a
broken bone in the hand, wrist or forearm. For people in many skilled
trades whose careers depend on finely-honed manual dexterity, this risk may
be unacceptable to them. About 2% of all deployments result in eye
injuries, some of them permanent. For people whose careers depend on
near-perfect eyesight, such as pilots, these risks may be unacceptable to
them. Some deployments result in hearing damage, sometimes permanent. For
people like musicians whose careers depend on finely tuned hearing, these
risks may be unacceptable to them. It is totally wrong for NHTSA to refuse
on-off switches to anyone who evaluates particular risks differently than
the average person, due to careers or avocations that make those risks
intolerable.
13. NHTSA's cost estimates evaluate consumer time as worth $9.20 per hour
for the functions needed to get a switch. This is probably a gross
underestimation for most of the people who are actually allowed to buy the
switches, and can afford to do so.
14. NHTSA's aggregate cost estimates depend upon an average rate of
inquiry on switches of 330,000 persons per year and an average rate of
80,000 permission letters issued to allow 80,000 switch installations. If
the surveys are anything like accurate for the numbers that will go through
this deliberately difficult and demeaning process of being "allowed" by
NHTSA to prevent air bag injuries and deaths in their household, these
rates of inquiry and installation switches may be low by a factor of 10 to
100, and possibly higher. It is extremely doubtful that only 80,000
persons per year will actually purchase switches. It is also certain that
switches will cost far more than the NHTSA estimates, so the aggregate cost
tables shown by NHTSA are almost certainly false, by huge margins. It may
be surmised that these tables were deliberately undervalued by NHTSA to
minimize the enormous economic difference being forced by the expensive
switches-only-with-permission rule, rather than allowing the original
proposal for much cheaper, and totally reversible, wiring disconnections,
on request.
15. The medical team at George Washington University attempted to evaluate
who is, and who is not, actually at risk from air bag deployments. First,
the panel said that the use of supplemental oxygen is not a
contra-indication for air bags, because there were no known fires from air
bag deployments. There are two NHTSA investigations for complaints of "Air
Bag Exhaust Fire", one on 1995 Hyundai Accents and one on 1995 Toyota
Corollas. Last July, an inadvertent deployment on a Neon was reported in
USA Today that set the driver's clothes alight. Many people received severe
arm burns from early Chrysler bags, before the exhaust vent locations were
changed. Second, the panel said that athsma was not a contra-indication
for air bags, because there was no evidence that this was occurring with
higher frequency in the presence of air bags. The October 21, 1991 Jacobus
Memorandum sent to Bob Shelton at NHTSA notes that GM reported two cases of
near-asphyxiation from air bag deployments, at a time when the total number
of deployments was quite low. These two obviously false examples call the
entire medical analysis into question for validity.
16. In the "Comparison of New Proposed Rule Making and the Final Rule,"
NHTSA says that the final rule follows the original 1/6/97 proposal in
several respects, including "Most important, the rule makes a means of
turning off air bags available to vehicle owners." Since the majority of
owners who have expressed a desire to turn off their bags would be only
able to do so by committing perjury under Title 18, United States Code,
Section 1001, this statement is ridiculously false.
17. NHTSA ignores in the rulemaking the probability that some short women
will adjust their seats in extreme measures to achieve the over-ten-inch
clearance NHTSA claims is safe. In doing so, they will reduce their
car-control abilities in ways that will hamper their ability to control the
vehicle, particularly in sudden emergencies. This effect will almost
certainly precipitate some severe and fatal crashes that would not
otherwise occur, the effects of which will not be counted as
caused-by-the-restrictive-ruling crashes.
18. NHTSA discusses many plans for potentially safer future Advanced
Technology or Smart Bags. These discussions have no bearing whatsoever on
the needs to dismantle the deadly 200 mph style bags in almost all 1997 and
earlier model vehicles. Every person with those bags deserves the right to
disconnect them, by any means they prefer.
19. It is known that the majority of company and group commenters that
objected to deactivation on request, did so for commercial reasons,
principally the fear of lawsuits in a confused arena where some cars do and
some do not have active air bags. This places the monetary fears of
lawsuits ahead of the value of human lives, particularly the lives of
children, and that is simply unacceptable. Even if Rebecca Blackman wins
her multi-million dollar lawsuit against VW, that will in no way compensate
for the decapitation of her daughter by a device known to be deadly to
children at least 28 years ago. No person should be forced, against their
will, to leave these deadly devices active.
20. Including some of the cases under investigation, air bags have killed
a little over 100 people. If you accept the 2,620 number for saves, this
means that air bags kill just under 4% of the number of people they save.
I know of no other federal mandate that requires unwilling citizens to run
a 4% risk of death, by a so-called "safety device", one that many people
would not agree to purchase and use of their own free will.
21. NHTSA says it has taken a balanced approach in establishing the
process for determining which vehicle owners may have a dealer or repair
business install an on-off switch. In other areas of the data, it is
clear that the approach is aimed almost completely at limiting the number
of installed switches to the very minimum, regardless of people's needs and
desires, and in total contradiction to nearly 100% of the individual comments.
22. NHTSA says: "The actions being announced by NHTSA in this final rule
will have the effect, directly or indirectly, of giving the public a sense
of control over the risks associated with current air bags, and restoring
objectivity to the public's perception of those risks." Since the majority
of people who wish to disconnect will only be able to do so by committing
perjury under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, this statement is
ridiculously false.
23. NHTSA says it has no evidence of misuse of current on-off switches,
and no reason to suspect widespread misuse of future ones. Therefore there
is no reason whatsoever to restrict switch availability in any way, or to
allow them for only certain groups of people.
24. NHTSA has totally ignored the anti-safety effects of trying to force
parents to always put children in the back seat, under threat of air bag
induced injuries and fatalities if they let them sit in front. Some
children occasionally require more parental control than is possible from
front to rear seat. The diversion of the driver's attention to control
difficult children will almost certainly cause some crashes, injuries and
fatalities that would not otherwise occur. This is an unacceptable risk
for NHTSA to force upon unwilling parents who would prefer to use on-off
switches and allow children to sometimes ride in front.
Pick some, but not all of these items, and craft your individual petition.
Please use your own words to express each idea with the emphasis you
consider important.
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National Motorists Association 800-882-2785
mailto:nma@motorists.com http://www.motorists.com/
Advocating, Protecting and Representing the Rights of North American Motorists